The Human Resource Executive Effect in Initial Public Offering Firms by Welbourne, Theresa  M. & Cyr, Linda  A.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
February 1999 
The Human Resource Executive Effect in Initial Public Offering 
Firms 
Theresa M. Welbourne 
Cornell University 
Linda A. Cyr 
Harvard University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Human Resource Executive Effect in Initial Public Offering Firms 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] There is much discussion about HRM becoming strategic, in part by hiring a senior HR 
executive. This study explores whether that recommendation can help entrepreneurial, growth-oriented 
companies. By applying organizational inertia concepts, we study whether having a senior HRM executive, 
reporting to the CEO, affects firm performance in a sample of initial public offering (IPO) firms. Results 
indicate that smaller and fast-growth IPOs experience the most gain from having a senior human 
resource executive. 
Keywords 
research, earnings, employee, performance, IPO, human resource, company 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Welbourne, T. M. & Cyr, L. R. (1999). The human resource executive effect in initial public offering firms 
(CAHRS Working Paper #99-03). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/102 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/102 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S
The Human Resource Executive Effect in
Initial Public Offering Firms
Theresa M. Welbourne
Linda A. Cyr
Working Paper  9 9 – 0 3
Advancing the World of Work
CAHRS / Cornell University
187 Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY  14853-3901  USA
Tel.  607 255-9358
www.ilr.cornell.edu/CAHRS/
The Human Resource Executive Effect in IPO’s WP 99-03
Page 1
THE HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE EFFECT
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING FIRMS
THERESA M. WELBOURNE
Cornell University
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
393 Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
607/255-1139
FAX: 607/255-1836
tw19@cornell.edu
and
LINDA A. CYR
Harvard University
Graduate School of Business
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA   02163
617/495-6505
lcyr@hbs.edu
December 5, 2000
(in press, Academy of Management Journal)
Working Paper 99-03
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrs
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.  It is
intended to make results of Center research available to others interested in preliminary form to
encourage discussion and suggestions.
Please direct all correspondence to Theresa Welbourne.
This study was partially supported by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies and
the Entrepreneurship and Personal Enterprise Program, both at Cornell University in addition to
the Society for Human Resource Management Foundation.
We wish to thank Alice Andrews, Jay Barney, John Bishop, John Boudreau, Lee Dyer, Pat
Wright, the seminar participants at Ohio State University and the Wharton School of Business in
addition to the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this paper and earlier
versions of the manuscript.
The Human Resource Executive Effect in IPO’s WP 99-03
Page 2
THE HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE EFFECT
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING FIRMS
There is much discussion about HRM becoming strategic, in part by hiring a senior HR
executive.  This study explores whether that recommendation can help entrepreneurial, growth-
oriented companies.  By applying organizational inertia concepts,  we study whether having a
senior HRM executive, reporting to the CEO, affects firm performance in a sample of initial
public offering (IPO) firms.   Results indicate that smaller and fast-growth IPOs experience the
most gain from having a senior human resource executive.
Today’s fast-paced, competitive business environment has resulted in “rediscovery” of
human resource management as a function that may be able to enhance firm competitiveness
and performance by being ‘strategic’ (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Dyer & Kochan, 1995; Pfeffer,
1998; Ulrich, 1997).  The potential contributions of strategic human resource management
(SHRM) appear to emanate from two perspectives.  The first focuses on aligning human
resource policies and procedures with business or corporate strategies, and the second is an
organizational level approach that includes a senior HRM executive on the top management
team.  Although both perspectives are being discussed by practitioners and researchers, most
of the research to date has addressed the first perspective, the effect of various HRM practices
on firm performance (Arthur, 1992; Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995).
Several studies have considered the rol of human resource professionals in the
business planning process (Huselid, 1993; Martell & Carroll, 1995; Wright, McMahan,
McCormick & Sherman, 1996), but research directly assessing the effect on firm performance of
having an HRM executive in a senior management position has not been conducted.  This is an
important part of the strategy equation because the senior HRM executive develops policies and
procedures to “match” business strategy and directly influence the development of business
strategy.  In addition, the senior executive may bring critical resources (funding, people) to the
HRM department, thus enhancing the department’s ability to implement practices (Abrahamson,
1979; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987).
While much of the prior SHRM research has focused on combinations of policies and
procedures, we aim to contribute to the SHRM literature by studying what we think is an
untested assumption.  That assumption is that having a senior HRM executive, reporting to the
CEO,  positively affects firm performance.  One possible reason for the lack of empirical
research addressing the effect on performance of having a senior HRM executive is that the
SHRM literature provides little theoretical guidance to help us understand the conditions under
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which having a senior HRM executive will contribute to firm performance.  Contingency theory
and resource-based theory approaches to the study of SHRM (the most dominant theoretical
approaches to the topic) have been limited to the study of HRM policies and practices (Delery &
Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Koch & McGrath, 1996; Schuler, 1987; Schuler & Jackson, 1987).
Another possible reason for the relative lack of research on the performance effects of
having a senior HRM executive may be the fact that most samples studied (primarily Fortune
500 organizations) have little variance in HRM reporting.  Companies studied to date tend to be
larger and older, and most have what could be called ‘strategic HRM’ (at least in terms of HRM
executive reporting structure).  Deciding whether a senior HRM executive will be part of the top
management team is a business decision that represents one of the earliest and most important
steps in the SHRM process.  Baron, Burton, and Hannon (1996), in an extensive study of Silicon
Valley start-ups, found that early decisions about HRM were systematically linked to later HRM
practices and major business decisions (e.g. whether a company goes public or replacing the
CEO).
Given the need to examine our research question in a sample of firms that ha  variance
in human resource executive reporting, our study is conducted with a group of initial public
offering (IPO) firms.  These companies are opportune for studying cause and effect because
many have recently made important structural and management team decisions (due to their
being relatively new firms and entering a growth stage anticipated by the funding acquired in the
IPO), they are at a stage where they obtain funding to implement plans specified in their
prospectus (the document submitted to the Security and Exchange Commission when they go
public), and they experience significant variance in performance soon after the IPO.
Additionally, IPO firms are of considerable interest to business professionals, investors,
and politicians.  These IPO firms have potential to affect shareholder wealth, economic growth,
job growth, innovation, and investment.  According to Shane (1996), newer entrepreneurial firms
(of which IPO firms are a part) account for 80% of the new jobs created in the United States.  A
recent Fortune article (Wyatt, 1996) titled “America’s amazing IPO bonanza” characterized the
IPO market as “big, powerful... and reinvigorating the U.S. economy.”
In summary, the study that we describe in this paper considers the effect of having a
senior HRM executive on the top management team on firm performance.  We employ a
longitudinal research design that tracks the effect of an early decision regarding the strategic
positioning of the HRM function on subsequent performance over a 3-year period of time.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The strategic management field has traditionally studied the link between business
strategy and organizational structure (Bruderer & Singh, 1996), and the way the topic has been
addressed by HRM researchers has been to operationalize HRM structure as the study of HRM
practices (Capelli & Singh, 1992).  However, organizational structure also includes reporting
arrangements (Bruderer & Singh, 1996), and it is possible that HRM reporting has its own
unique effect on a firm’s performance.
Wood (1995) noted that firms were successful in implementing high commitment
strategies when they integrated their human resource management functions as part of the
process.  They were able to do this only when the HRM function (or person) was taken
“seriously.”  Being taken seriously is not a construct that has been measured to date in the
SHRM literature.  However, being taken seriously is linked with departmental and individual
organizational power, which is reflected to some degree in its reporting structure (Abrahamson,
1979; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974).  Models of organizational power have
been proposed for studying human resource management (Ferris & Judge, 1991), and Wright
and McMahan (1992) noted that this could be an alternative way to understand SHRM.
Abrahamson (1979) and Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) examined the effects of position
criticality (job status associated with title), and using a resource dependence framework, they
noted that the position itself was important in obtaining resources (e.g. pay) .  Position status is
a legitimate form of power (French & Raven, 1968), and resources tend to be allocated to those
individuals who possess higher levels of power (Pfeffer, 1981).  It follows then that the reporting
structure of the HRM executive should be important in understanding that person’s ability to
gather resources for the department.
Resources gathered can include monetary resources and information.  If the HRM
executive is part of the top executive team, then that individual will also acquire information,
which is key for contributing to the performance of the firm.  Given that the focus of the SHRM
literature has been on fitting HRM practices together (via bundles) or fitting practices with
business strategies, it is critical that the senior HRM executive have information to use in
developing programs.  Thus, reporting structure is important to the traditional SHRM agenda
(creating practices that align with each other and that align with business strategy) because
information from the top executive team is necessary for alignment and fit (Jackson, Schuler &
Rivero, 1989; Miles & Snow, 1984).  Researchers, using ideas from the literature on resource-
based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), have also noted that reporting structure can be a unique
resource.  As such, reporting structures (and the firm level strengths that develop as a result of
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those management decisions) can create company-specific competitive advantage that is not
easy to imitate (Koch & McGrath, 1996).
A more complete management team, with someone responsible for understanding the
implications of major business decisions on employees, should result in better business
decisions (Dyer & Kochan, 1995; Martell & Carroll, 1995; Mohrman, Lawler & McMahan, 1996).
Pfeffer (1998) recently wrote, in a chapter titled “Why smart organizations sometimes do dumb
things,” that a focus on accounting and finance without equal interest in human resource
management can lead to negative results.  We argue that having someone on the top
management team whose job is HRM should lead to a more complete team and better, more
informed decision making.
It appears that reporting structure is a critical decision, and having a senior HRM
executive as part of the top management team, for all the reasons cited, should have a positive
effect on long-term firm performance.  Specifically, we hypothesize that having a senior
executive reporting directly to the CEO will have a direct and positive effect on longer-term firm
performance.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a senior HRM executive reporting to the CEO will
experience higher long-term performance than those that do not
have a person in this position.
Rate of Growth
Two separate literatures suggest that having an HRM executive may be more beneficial
for firms that are growing.  Kazanjian (1988), expanding the literature on organizational life
cycle, noted that specific types of  problems occurred at different stages.  Those stages may or
may not be parallel to organizational life cycle.  One of the problems Kazanjian (1988) studied
was that of people and employee management.  He found that people-related problems were
important at two stages: one was the conceptual and development stage, and the second was
the growth stage.  This conclusion is supported by researchers in the SHRM field who address
life cycle and organizational change (Baird & Meshoulam, 1988; Milliman, Von Glinow, &
Nathan, 1991).
Contingency theory has been used in the SHRM literatur  to understand which human
resource practices are best for what types of organizations.  However, the theory offers little
guidance as to the variables one should use in developing contingencies to examine the effect
of senior HRM presence in the top management team.  An alternative way to address the
contingency issue, that builds on Kazanjian’s (1988) ideas, is to employ concepts about rate of
growth and inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1984).  Welbourne and Andrews (1996) recently
The Human Resource Executive Effect in IPO’s WP 99-03
Page 6
applied population ecology concepts regarding organizational inertia to develop a series of
hypotheses about the effect of human resource value (the degree to which firms value their
employees) on firm performance.  In their study, human resource value was measured, in part,
by examining whether firms had a human resource department.  Although they did not consider
reporting level, it seems reasonable that having a more strategic approach to HRM (via a senior
HRM executive reporting to the CEO) would enhance human resource value, which is defined
as “the degree to which firms consider employees important to business” (897).
They noted that structures and systems (such as having an HRM department) that
enhance HR value should positively affect firm performance when firms were “moving” rather
than “at rest.”  The logic behind their conclusion about being “at rest” or “in motion” comes from
the definition of inertia (Freeman & Hannan, 1990).  According to Welbourne and Andrews
(1996: 896), “although inertia conjures up images of stale, immobile organizations, the term
does not necessarily mean ‘standing still.’  Newton’s first law of motion states that an object at
rest tends to stay at rest and an object in motion tends to stay in motion. This overall tendency
to stay at rest or in motion is called inertia....Inertia keeps an organization moving during a
change, even though the direction has changed.”
They conclude that organizational processes enhancing human resource value will be
positive when a firm is “in motion.”  Therefore, rate of change or motion should be a critical
contingency variable.  Rate of change has not been studied yet in the SHRM literature.
Although typologies such as the one proposed by Miles and Snow (1984) discuss innovative,
entrepreneurial firms (prospector firms), the focus has been on a “state” (being a prospector vs.
an analyzer) rather than on rate of change.  Additionally, models of life cycle tend to focus on
linking HRM practices with a stage rather than the rate at which a firm is moving through stages
(Baird & Meshoulam, 1988).
Concepts of inertia, which focus on motion, provide a way to supplement contingency
theory ideas about SHRM and to specifically address the effect of having a senior HRM
executive.  A strategic approach to human resource reporting (i.e. having an executive reporting
directly to the CEO) should be something that enhances human resource value.  As a result,
having a senior HRM executive as part of the top management team should increase inertia,
which will be more positive for organizations as rate of growth increases.  We hypothesize that,
within our sample of firms, rate of growth will moderate the relationship between having a senior
HRM executive and firm performance.
Hypothesis 2:As rate of growth increases, the benefit from having a senior HRM
executive, reporting to the CEO, will increase.
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Firm Size
One other contingency variable can be studied by applying ideas about organizational
inertia that were developed in the population ecology literature.  Population ecology relies on the
structural inertia model (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991).  As such, researchers have developed
specific ideas around the concepts of firm size, concluding that structural inertia increases as
size increase (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  Although not specifically introduced in the population
ecology literature, key to our discussion is the fact that we are differentiating between two
different consequences of inertia on organizations, and the consequences depend on the firm’s
rate of growth.  Welbourne and Andrews (1996) alluded to this when they suggested that inertia
was “positive” for firms in their sample because the IPO firms were “moving;” however, they did
not specifically address rate of growth.
We suggest that inertia can have positive or negative organizational consequences
based on whether the firm is ‘moving’ or ‘at rest.’  When rate of growth increases, inertia can be
beneficial to the organization because it keeps the company moving forward.  Welbourne and
Andrews (1996: 896), noted that this type of “positive” consequence of inertia is increased by
structural cohesion (the result of enhanced human resource value), which they defined as “an
employee generated synergy that propels a company forward.”
Inertia can also lead to negative consequences that may be harmful to companies.
Rather than propelling the company forward, inertia can cause a company to continue to be “at
rest.”  Structural cohesion, when not matched with “motion” can be negative for today’s
organizations that require constant change.  If something in the organization enhances being “at
rest,” then that factor can have a negative impact on firm performance because it is causing
employees to maintain the status quo.
According to the structural inertia model, firm size should be associated with the form of
inertia that results in being “at rest.”  This is consistent with Newton’s second law of motion,
which states that acceleration decreases as mass increases.  When applied to organizations,
we can speculate that mass increases when the firm increases in size -- or adds more
employees.  When this happens, the firm starts to slow down (acceleration is decreased), and it
gets closer to being at the ‘at rest’ state described in the population ecology literature.
According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), forces exerted on organizations when they
increase in size result in higher levels of inertia, which are associated with maintaining their
status quo.  Things like investments in plant, property, and equipment, personnel, development
of administrative structures that result in routines, and political efforts aimed at maintaining the
status quo all contribute to slowing down the company’s rate of growth.  This view is consistent
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with the life cycle literature, which suggests later stages are associated with stability and a
struggle to retain and enhance momentum (Kazanjian, 1988).
The life cycle literature suggests that having a senior HRM executive would be more
likely to help an organization as it becomes older and larger (Baird & Meshoulam, 1988).  This is
because at later stages an organization is more complex and more likely (according to their
argument) to benefit from the expense associated with hiring a senior HR executive.   Contrary
to the traditional life cycle approach, arguments based on the inertia (or laws of motion) logic
suggest that HRM can have a negative consequence on firm performance when the firm is
larger.  If, as we suggested earlier, having a senior HRM executive as part of the top
management team increases human resource value, which then enhances inertia, then the
positive effect of having a senior HRM executive should decrease as firms become larger and
older because it tends to contribute to a continued and more prolonged state of being ‘at rest.’
And, being at rest, in today’s business environment, is associated with negative financial
consequences.  This is particularly relevant for the firms that we study, which are entering into
an increased competitive arena as a result of their being public for the first time.
Hypothesis 3:The effect of having a senior HRM executive reporting to the CEO
will be larger in smaller firms (when size is measured by number
of employees).
Lastly, we speculate that smaller firms with high rates of growth will experience the most
benefit from having a senior level HR executive.   Smaller, growth-oriented firms are more likely
to benefit from HR executive presence because the HR executive has a ‘bigger voice’ in the
firm. Not only does the smaller size allow the HR executive to have more impact (e.g. less
hierarchical layers to work through), but the needs placed on the organization from fast-growth
contribute to recognition that the HR executive can play an important role in the success of the
firm.  Recruitment, retention, and morale are key issues in growth firms, and as a result, the HR
executive may command more respect and be able to get more done in a smaller, fast-growth
business (Hendrickson & Psarouthakis, 1992).
Expanding the inertia-relatd concepts, smaller and high growth firms  have less mass
and are moving forward.  This means that they are the least likely group of companies to be
experiencing the type of inertia that is associated with being ‘at rest.’  As a result, they should
benefit the most from having a senior HR executive.
Hypothesis 4:Smaller firms experiencing higher rates of growth will benefit most
from having a senior HR executive.
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METHODS
Our research strategy involved selecting a specific cohort of IPO firms that went public in
a given year and then tracking those same firms over time to study the effects of their early
decisions regarding HRM reporting structure on their subsequent firm performance.  We
selected a sample of firms that went public in 1993 so that we could study long-term
performance after the IPO (e.g. performance from 1993 to year-end 1996)1.  The number of
firms that went public in 1993 and that produced a good or service (we excluded real estate
trusts and financial groups with no employees) was 585; of those companies we were able to
obtain the prospectuses (which are one of our primary data sources) for 535 firms.  Our sample
was further reduced to 476 because our dependent variables are stock price and earnings per
share for 1996.
As of December, 1996, 59 firms had changed form so that the financial data we needed
were no longer available.  Of the 59 firms that no longer reported stock price (or earnings), we
found that 50 had engaged in a merger or acquisition, 2 filed for bankruptcy, 1 went private, and
for 6 no information was available.  In order to examine potential survival bias (the firms that
dropped out were in some way inferior performers), we conducted an ANOVA to determine how
those firms for which we did not have complete data (the 59 that dropped out of the sample)
differed from the overall sample.  We found that there were no significant differences in any of
the variables used in the analyses for this research (e.g. risk factors at time of IPO, age of firm,
size measured by sales and number of employees, and net profitability).  The lack of significant
differences, we speculate, is due to the fact that mergers may be conducted for healthy as well
as financially troubled firms, and most of the firms for which we could no longer find data had
engaged in a merger or acquisition.
In addition, we were unable to obtain sales data for year-end 1992 (which is required to
calculate rate of growth) for all firms in the sample (it was not reported by some firms).  After
deleting firms that were extreme outliers on both size and age2 and including only those firms for
which we had complete data (including 1992 sales), our final sample was 360 organizations.  An
ANOVA comparing the final sample of firms (the 360) used in the analyses with those firms that
                                         
1 Researchers in the area of finance who have done work on IPOs suggest three years
as a measure of long-term performance, see Ritt r, 1991.
 2 There were three extreme outliers that were not included in this analysis; however,
when the analysis was run with those cases included, the results did not change.  Inclusion of
those cases artificially inflates means and standard deviations; therefore, the results reported
here exclude the extreme cases.
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were not included in the study (175) showed no significant differences for any of the variables
(from the time of the IPO that were in the prospectus) that we included in our study.
Data Collection and Coding
The primary data source was the prospectus of each firm.  The prospectus is the
document provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to the public
offering, and it is also the document circulated by the underwriter to assess demand for the
firm's stock.  The SEC requires that firms follow strict guidelines in the format.  In fact, the firm is
legally liable for any information that might mislead investors (O'Flaherty, 1984).  As noted by
Beatty and Zajac (1994), top management is accountable to the SEC and to stockholders
regarding the contents of the prospectus.  The Securities Act of 1933 sets the requirements for
the prospectus, thus assuring consistency in the type of information that is included in the
document.  The typical prospectus writing process involves at least three lawyers (one for the
company and one for each of the investment bankers), two investment banking firms, and at
least one certified public accountant.  Each party has a vested interest in providing the public
with an honest view of the company.  Thus, we can be reasonably assured that the prospectus
is a useful data source (Marino, Castaldi, & Dollinger, 1989).
Our coding strategy was developed and refined based on earlier research on IPO firms
(see method used by Welbourne and Andrews, 1996).  Code sheets and a coding handbook
were given to each coder after each individual attended an initial training session.  A total of five
coders worked on the data.  In addition, weekly meetings were held with coders to go over
problems and/or inconsistencies in the prospectuses.  Finally, we randomly cross coded
prospectuses (every 10th prospectus).  For the variables used in this study, agreement was
90% or higher among the coders.  Financial data were also obtained from COMPUSTAT, Going
Public: The IPO Reporter (for financial data at the time of the IPO), and from a database
obtained from the Securities Data Corporation.
Sample Characteristics
At the time of its IPO, the average firm in the sample (n=360) was 7.06  years old (s.d.
7.07).  The median firm, however, was 6 years old, and the range was from 1 to 47 years old,
with most of the firms (80%) being less than 10 years old.  Given that the age data were
skewed, we logged the variable for the analyses reported in this paper.  The average firm in the
sample  employed 786 people (s.d. 1,485).  The median firm had 207 employees, with a range
from 1 to 13,235.  Given the skewed distribution on size, we logged number of employees for
the analyses.  As a supplement to our analysis, we restricted the sample on both age and size
(firms with between 10 and 10,000 employees that were between 1 and 20 years old), and we
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obtained the same pattern of results (beta coefficients).  Given the similarity in results and that
we had no theoretical reason for restricting the sample (and due to the fact that we tested an
interaction with  size and wanted variance in those terms), we decided to report the equation
using the larger sample and the logged variables.
On average, net profit per share was $0.17 (s.d. $0.55), and the initial offering price per
share was $10.20 (s.d. $7.27).  Using the classification scheme reported by the Small Business
Administration to determine industry, the sample’s highest concentration of firms was in
manufacturing (50.6%).  A total of 19% of the firms were in service industries, while 5.2% were
in wholesale trade, 7.4% in transportation and/or communications, and 8.2% in retail trade.
Other industries include .2% in agriculture, 3% in mining, 1.9% in construction, and 4.4% in
health care and financial services.  Table 1 provides a summary of the means, standard
deviations, and medians for variables used in the analyses.
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses
Mean
Standard
Deviation Median
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1.  Senior HRM executive (0,1)  .07 .26 .00 1.00
2.  1996 Stock price 11.63 10.13 9.00  .14 1.00
3.  1996 Earnings per share -.13 1.57 .15 .12 .35 1.00
4.  Change in sales (92 to 93) .86 4.58 .29 -.04 -.08 -.01 1.00
5.  Change in sales (92 to 95) 2.70 7.68 1.08 -.06 -.08 -.14 .82 1.00
6. Initial stock price (at IPO) 10.20 7.29 9.75 .16 .09 -.11 .001 -.05 1.00
7. Age of company (log) 1.76 .93 1.94 .04 .10 .11 -.09 -.14 .09 1.00
8. Number of employees (log) 5.29 1.73 5.41 .26 .39 .34 .02 -.07 .27 .21 1.00
9. Risk factors 3.88 1.50 4.00 -.19 -.15 -.19 -.003 .17 -.15 -.07 -.41 1.00
10. Net income per share (IPO) .17 .55 .24 .07 .35 .32 -.11 -.15 .17 .18 .47 -.29 1.00
11.  Union presence (0/1) .20 .40 .00 .16 .22 .21 -.07 -.10 .22 -.006 .43 -.25 .24 1.00
12.  Beta (year end 1996) .87 1.06 .86 -.01 .16 .16 -.003 .01 -.002 .03 .02 -.006 .04 -.03 1.00
All correlations above .08 are significant at the .10 level; above .10 are significant at the .05 level, above .12 are significant at .01 level,
and above .17 are significant at the .001 level.
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Independent Variables
Senior HRM Executive.  We coded from the ‘Management’ section of the prospectuses
whether or not each firm had a senior HRM executive as part of the top management team (i.e.
VP of HRM who reported to the CEO).  Thus, our variable of interest was dichotomously
measured with “1" representing those firms that reported having a senior HRM executive and
“0" representing those firms without a senior HRM executive.  A total of 37 (7%) firms from the
overall sample of 535 and 26 out of the smaller sample of 360 (7.2 %) were coded as having a
senior HRM executive reporting to the CEO.
Rate of Growth and Firm Size.  We obtained sales data for years 1992 and 1993 and
from 1992 and 1995 (from COMPUSTAT), and we calculated the percentage change in sales
for those years.  We included the first measure of rate of growth (from 1992 to 1993) in order to
be consistent with the other data (all obtained at the time of the IPO).  However, because we
expected low variance in rate of growth prior to the IPO (firms go public in order to obtain the
cash to grow and because one year is a limited period of time), we supplemented the study with
the second measure, rate of growth from 1992 to 1995.  Company size (also obtained from the
prospectus) was measured as number of employees at the time of the IPO.
Dependent Variables
Given that the primary reason investors choose to put money into an IPO is to make
money when the firm’s stock price increases over time, we examined measures related to stock
price growth.  This is consistent with recommendations of researchers who suggested future
strategic HRM studies should include measures of shareholder wealth and stock price (Abowd,
Milkovich & Hannon, 1990; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990).  In addition, market-based measures
represent the most prevalent and relevant firm performance measures in the IPO literature (see
Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995 for a review).   Thus, our primary dependent variable of interest is
year-end 1996 stock price.  After controlling for initial stock price (adjusted for splits, buybacks,
and any other changes that affected unit price), this should reflect the increase in value of the
firm in the first three years following the IPO.
In order to supplement our study, we also predicted year-end 1996 earnings per share.
Earnings per share (EPS) is a measure of internal performance that is often used by analysts
and investors to assess future value of the firm.  In the EPS analyses, we included earnings per
share at the time of the IPO as a control variable.  By conducting the analyses in this way, we
eliminate measurement issues surrounding the use of change scores.  However, we did run the
analyses with change scores (percentage change from IPO to year-end 1996 as dependent
variables), and the patterns of results (including significance levels) did not change.
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Control Variables
Several control variables, selected based on a review of both the strategic human
resource management and initial public offering literatures (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Huselid,
1995 Welbourne & Andrews, 1996), were used in the analyses.  Net profit per share at the time
of the IPO was included as a performance measure.  In addition, we coded whether the firm
was unionized or not.  We thought that this was an important control because a union presence
may affect management decisions regarding the hiring of senior HRM staff (Huselid, Jackson, &
Schuler, 1997).  We included company age (calculated as 1993 - date incorporated) as an
additional control because firm age may be related to characteristics of the management team
and growth rate.  Nine (one is omitted) industry classifications, based on categories reported by
the Small Business Administration, were used for the analyses.
Although our sample of IPO firms consists of companies that are considered to be higher
risk investments than companies currently in the public market (due to their having no prior
stock price history), we expect that each firm will be subject to varying degrees of risk.
Therefore, an additional control variable (logged) indicates the level of risk faced by each firm.
Each prospectus contains a section listing all risk factors faced by the firm.  These risk factors
must be disclosed to meet the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
presence of the following risk factors were included in this measure: new product, few or limited
products, limited number of years in operation, inexperienced management, technical risk,
seasonality, customer dependence, supplier dependence, inexperienced underwriters,
competition, legal proceedings against company, liability, and government regulation.  The
summated risk measure ranged from 0 to 9, with a mean of 3.88 and a standard deviation of
1.50. Prior research on initial public offering firms found that this measure was a useful way to
code risk (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Rasheed and Datta, 1994).  Finally, to control for the firm’s
sensitivity to overall market movements (important because we are predicting stock price
growth), we included beta as of year end 1996 (obtained from COMPUSTAT for the period
ending 1996) as a measure of systematic risk.  Given that beta is not reported until a firm has
been public for two years, we could not obtain beta for the companies at the time of the IPO3.
RESULTS
Table 1 includes the bivariate correlations for the variables in the analyses.  The r sults
show that having a senior HRM executive is positively correlated with 1996 stock price (.14) and
                                         
3 The analyses, without beta, result in the same pattern of results, including significance
levels.
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earnings per share (.12) in addition to initial stock price (.16) and union presence (.16).  The
strongest relationship is with size (.26), indicating that larger firms are more likely to have a
senior HRM executive reporting to the CEO.
Tests of Hypotheses
We tested the hypotheses by running a series of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression equations.  The analyses were conducted in three steps, where in the first step we
entered all of the control variables and the independent variables of interest.  In the second step
we entered the two-way interaction terms, and in the last step we entered a three-way
interaction (between rate of growth, firm size, and HR executive presence).  Additionally, we ran
the analyses using two different measures of rate of change (growth in sales from 1992 to 1993
and from 1992 to 1995).   
Effects for Stock Price.  Table 2 includes results of the OLS regression analyses
predicting future stock price.  Our test of hypothesis 1, which proposed a direct effect for having
a senior HRM executive, was not supported.  Although Table 2 reports the equation with all
interaction terms, the results (i.e., the non-significant betas on the HR executive variable) were
the same in the regression without the interaction terms (i.e., step 1).  There was no significant
effect for having an HR executive on either dependent variable (stock price or earnings per
share).
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we calculated interaction terms that crossed the senior HR
executive variable with rate of growth and firm size.  The change in R2 associated with the
second step was significant using both measures of rate of growth (p < .01), and the only
interaction term that was significant in that equation was change in sales and HR executive
presence. This provides support for hypothesis 2.  However, hypothesis 3 was not supported for
stock price.  Lastly, the three-way interaction (between change in sales, firm size, and HR
executive presence) was not significant.
We plotted the data for the significant interaction using the constant and unstandardized
beta coefficients for change in sales (we used the 1992 to 1993 rate of growth measure for the
plot) and HR executive presence (at 2 standard deviations above and below the mean) in the
analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  Figure 1a shows those results.  As predicted in hypothesis 2,
firms experiencing a higher rate of growth improve their stock price performance when they
have  a senior HRM executive reporting to the CEO.  However, among low-growth firms, there
appears to be a negative effect for having an HR executive.
As a further test of the significance of the interaction terms, we tested for the significance
of each coefficient (slope of Y on HR executive presence at different levels of rate of growth) by
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calculating the slope and the standard error associated with the slope (see method described in
Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990) at the two levels of rate of growth used in the plot of interaction
terms (low and high levels based on standard deviations).  The results of the follow-up tests
indicate that the effect is significant at both low and high values of rate of growth.  This means
that HR executive presence significantly and positively affects fast-growth firms, and it equally
significantly and negatively affects low-growth firms in terms of stock price growth.
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TABLE 2: Regression Analyses for Year-End Stock Price and Year-End Earnings Per Share  (1996)
Stock price, 1996                                   Earnings, 1996
Sales change data used Sales change data used
92 to 93 92 to 95 92 to 93 92 to 95
Variables Beta                         Beta                       Beta                     Beta
H1:  HRM Executive (0/1) -.05 -.13 .08 .05
  Change in sales -.03 .02 -.02 -.04
 Initial offering price -.43*** -.42*** -.54*** -.54***
 Age of company (log) .05 .05 .11* .10*
 Size (number of employees) .43*** .42*** .46*** .46***
 Risk factors -.26*** -.27*** -.20*** -.20***
 Net income per share -.09 -.09  -.17*** -.17***
 Union presence (0/1) .10* .10* .16*** .16**
 Beta (year end 1996) .11**    .11* .14*** .14***
______________________________________________________________________________
 Change in R2 - Step 1 .44*** .44*** .48*** .48***
______________________________________________________________________________
H2: Change in sales &
        HR executive .16** .23** -.01 -.006
H3: Firm size &
        HR executive -.04 -.03 -.14* -.16*
______________________________________________________________________________
Change  in R2 - Step 2 .02** .02** .01* .01*
______________________________________________________________________________
H4: 3-way interaction
(change in sales*size*HR) -.10 -.10 -.03 .02
______________________________________________________________________________
Change  in R2 - Step 3 .003 .002 .000 .000
______________________________________________________________________________
TOTAL R2 .46 .46 .49 .49
F  13.92*** 15.87*** 12.40*** 13.98***
*** p < .001             ** p < .01         * p < .05              + p < .10
Standardized beta coefficients are reported.  Industry codes, although not reported, are included in the analyses.
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FIGURE 1: Plot of Interaction Terms
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Figure 1a
Predicting 1996 year-end stock prices:
Interaction of HR executive presence
and change in sales (1992 to 1993)
Figure 1b
Predicting 1996 earnings per
share: Interaction of HR executive
presence and firm size (number of
employees)
-30.00
-28.00
-26.00
-24.00
-22.00
-20.00
-18.00
-16.00
-14.00
-12.00
-10.00
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
No HR Exec. Yes, HR Exec
Larger firms Smaller firms
The Human Resource Executive Effect in IPO’s WP 99-03
Page 19
Effects for Earnings Per Share.  Table 2 also includes the results of the regression
analyses for earnings per share.  Again, we found no significant effects for having a senior HRM
executive.  Thus, we find no support for hypothesis 1.
The change in R2 associated with the interaction terms being added to the equation was
again significant (p < .05); however, in these analyses the interaction terms for firm size and HR
executive were significant.  This provides support for hypothesis 3 but not hypothesis 2.  Figure
1b includes a plot of the interaction, and it indicates support for hypothesis 3.  Smaller firms
benefit from having someone in the HR executive role; however, it appears that larger firms (in
our sample these tend to be mid-size firms) seem to experience a negative effect on earnings
per share from having an HR executive on the top management team.  The three-way
interaction term had no significant effect on earnings per share.
Again, we tested the significance of the interaction terms for both the low and high levels
of firm size.  The results indicate that the interaction effect is significant at both low and high
values of firm size (measured as number of employees).  Thus, HR executive presence
significantly and positively affects smaller firms, and it significantly and negatively affects larger
organizations (with earnings per share as the dependent variable).
DISCUSSION
Our hypotheses for the direct effects of strategic HRM, or for having a senior human
resource management executive reporting directly to the CEO, were not supported for either
stock price or for earnings per share.  The results for interactions of HR executive presence with
rate of growth and firm size were supported,  although we obtained different results for our two
dependent variables.  The overall pattern of findings suggests that HR executives can have a
positive effect on stock price growth for fast-growth firms, and they can also have a positive
effect on earnings growth within smaller firms.  In addition, the results indicate that the HR
executive is associated with lower stock price performance for low growth firms and lower
earnings per share for larger (in our sample, mid-size) organizations.
Contrary to hypothesis four, the three-way interaction between rate of growth, firm size,
and HR executive presence was not supported.  This may be due to the relatively small number
of HR executives in the sample or some other uniqueness associated with the particular sample
studied.  However, as the research now stands, we cannot interpret our results as suggesting
that small, growth-oriented firms benefit from having a senior HR executive. We seem to be
obtaining two separate and distinct effects, at least when related to our sample and the
dependent variables that we studied.
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Our findings may be related to the types of goals that small vs. fast-growth firms are
attempting to achieve, or they may be associated with the unique context of the IPO.  Fast-
growth firms may hire a senior HR executive because they are more oriented toward stock price
growth as a strategic goal (many fast-growth firms have investors who want to ‘cash out’ when
the firm goes public or soon after the firm conducts its IPO).  These organizations may set stock
price growth as a goal for the executive team, including the HR executive.  At the same time,
smaller firms (which may not have as many outside investors since they may be going public at
a relatively early stage in their life cycle) with an HR executive may be more focused on
earnings growth.
The IPO is a critical change event for organizations, and the effects of the IPO on
employees and the management team have not been investigated in depth.  Perhaps the
demands of the IPO (e.g. being in the public eye, stock ownership for many employees,
management being busy with investor relations, etc.) are particularly difficult for smaller and
fast-growth firms, and these problems can be mitigated by the presence of an HR executive.  It
may also be the case that investors know the value of a senior level HR executive, and the
presence of this individual at the time of the IPO helps increase investor interest in the firm, thus
spurring stock price growth.
The pattern of findings supports the idea that rate of growth matters, and rate of growth
interacts with having a senior HRM executive to affect firm performance.  Additional research on
the effect of rate of growth as a contingency variable, perhaps focusing on the more traditional
SHRM agenda (i.e. human resource practices) would be useful.  Given the general mixed
results obtained from contingency theory work in SHRM (Delery & Doty, 1996),  studying rate of
growth may shed new light on these studies.  In addition, given the importance of change to
large firms, it is quite possible that rate of change, or ability to change, will be an important
construct to include in studies of SHRM within larger firms.
Moderating Effect of Firm Size
The importance of understanding rate of change seems particularly salient given our
results for firm size.  The human resource management department is under considerable
pressure today to become more strategic and to be a business partner.  But for firms in our
sample (which is notably a limited segment of the population of organizations), we find a
negative effect on performance among larger firms that report having a senior HRM executive.
It is important to note, for purposes of interpretation, that the larger firms in our study are
actually mid-size firms.  It is quite possible that the negative effect for the senior HRM executive
is linked to the fact that mid-size firms have special challenges associated with lacking flexibility
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and resources.  Perhaps they are not as nimble as they once were, yet they do not enjoy the
substantial resources of being a large firm; they may be precariously “stuck in the middle.”
For example, the senior HRM executive in a mid-size firm may not have a staff that is
adequate to meet the challenges faced by the firm at this stage.  It is highly likely that the
executive at this stage is just starting to face challenges that did not exist when the firm was
smaller (e.g. lawsuits, need for hiring HR staff, etc.).  In addition, as the firm expands, it is likely
to have multiple HR strategies (Boxall, 1993).  If the HR executive is unwilling to diversify the
HR system (which means giving up power), then he/she could be contributing to the firm’s
inability to change.  It is also possible that the senior HRM executive at this stage is willing, but
not qualified, to handle a more diverse organization with multiple HR strategies (Wright, et al.,
1996).  At the same time, the HR executive may be willing and professionally able but restricted
from action due to organizational bureaucracy that often accompanies being a larger firms.
Studies that focus on the effects of having a senior HRM executive as part of the top
management team in small, mid-size, and large firms are needed to clarify the issues raised in
our study.  The firm size effect may have implications for large firms as they begin to transform
their HRM departments.  There has been an ongoing debate in the SHRM about the need for fit
versus flexibility (Morris & Jones, 1993; Wright & Snell, 1998).  Perhaps the negative effect of
having a senior HRM executive in the larger firms is due to the firm’s attempts to obtain “fit” at a
time when the firm still needs to be nimble and flexible.  Our results could also be interpreted as
suggesting a need for strong HRM leadership at the business unit level rather than at the
organizational level.  The business unit is most likely to be similar to the smaller firms in our
study.
Implications of Firm Growth
Our results suggest that other factors designed to enhance human resource value (e.g.
training, compensation, etc.) may increase firm performance as companies engage in change.
However, the results also suggest that doing things to inflate human resource value (the degree
to which a firm values people), at a time when a firm is at rest, may not necessarily lead to
positive consequences for firm performance.  This is due to the fact that higher levels of human
resource value at this stage may encourage employees to stay where they are (become
inflexible) rather than to change.  And in today’s work environment, change appears to be
critical for maintaining one’s competitive position and long-term viability (Eisenhardt & Brown,
1998).
Our findings suggest that rate of change may be an important construct for theory
development and for expanding studies that have considered stage of growth.  In an effort to
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understand the formation of new firms and firm growth, several life cycle or stage models have
been suggested (e.g. Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Starbuck, 1971).  However, these models tend to
be static.  Additional conceptual work that examines the pace at which firms travel through
various stages should be developed to enhance our understanding of firm growth.  As the stage
models suggest, each stage brings with it a new set of problems.  However, if rate of change is
escalated, we may find that preparation for those problems at an early stage is more important
for firm survival and performance.   The human resource factor, which is the focus of this paper,
is only one of a number of issues that can be examined more adequately by introducing rate of
change.
Our study may have important implications for development of the management team for
fast-growth firms.  Perhaps as rate of growth escalates, the ability of the CEO to delegate duties
to a team of experts is even more critical.  Where in a lower growth firm the CEO may have time
to learn and adjust to the needs of the new stages of his/her organization in addition to getting
out in the company and talking to employees to acquire information, this may not be the case in
a fast-growth organization.  The human resource executive, or someone who serves a similar
role,  may be particularly critical because as rate of change increases, the leadership team may
have less time to make decisions.  Perhaps the HR executive is in a better position to acquire
and aggregate information from all employees in the organization.
When the organization begins to ‘sl w down,’ once again the top team members have a
chance to take stock, learn, and they may, at times, become just a little too confident in their
own abilities.  If this were the case, top management (including the CEO) may begin to listen
less to employees, the HR executive, or other experts in the organization and instead rely on
themselves.  This type of behavior may contribute to the cycle of being ‘at rest,’ or executives
may be simply making mistakes due to their having incomplete information.  Although these
ideas are grounded in theory and the results of our study, they are speculative and need to be
further developed.  Additional work, addressing the needs of fast growth firms, both from
theoretical and empirical perspectives, are needed.
Limitations
As already noted, even though our research enhances the SHRM literature by studying
a topic that has not received attention in the past, our inability to complement the study with
more traditional SHRM work somewhat limits the interpretation of our data.  Future work should
include measures of both aspects of SHRM: policy and reporting structure.  In addition, more
detailed work on how the senior HRM executive assists and complements the top management
team in non-HRM issues will be critical for understanding their true effects on performance.
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Our study focuses on the profile of the firm at the time of the IPO; as a result, we do not
have data on changes in senior HRM executive reporting from the time of the IPO to 1996.  It is
quite possible that firms that did not have a senior executive when they went public added a
senior HRM executive subsequent to their IPOs.  This is another area that warrants further
investigation.  Lastly, we are unsure how generalizable our results are to non-IPO firms.  If the
underlying theory that we used in our study can be applied to any type of organization that is
growing or going through a major change initiative, then the results of our study may apply to
larger firms and to non-IPO firms.
Conclusion
The results of our study add to the growing literature in the field of SHRM by expanding
the work to a new sample of firms (initial public offering firms) and by empirically assessing the
effects of having a senior HRM executive on two measures of firm performance (long-term stock
price and earnings performance) that are not often included in this type of research.  In addition,
we supplemented the SHRM research by introducing a new contingency variable, rate of
growth, and by further developing the implications of organizational inertia for researchers in the
field of HRM.  Our findings suggest that smaller and fast-growth firms can benefit from having a
senior HRM executive as part of their top management team.  Although consistent with theory,
this finding may come as a surprise to many people who work with smaller, entrepreneurial
firms (e.g. investment bankers, venture capitalists, CEOs).  The expense of hiring a senior HRM
executive is more than likely something that many young firms would prefer not to incur;
however, if they plan to grow rapidly, our research suggests that adding a senior HRM executive
at an earlier stage may be a wise choice.
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